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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent events have intensified the debates over "freedom of contract"
and governmental intervention in China: the Shanxi coal mining reform
and the forced mergers, the corkage fee dispute in Guizhou, the offers
posted on the Internet selling human milk, contractual surrogacy
arrangement, contractually designed money laundering scam in western
China under the name of western China development, just to name a few.
By studying the evolution of China's contract law and providing a
comparison with the western notion of "freedom of contract," this article
relies on both U.S. and Chinese frameworks in addressing these questions.
This article examines several challenges toward China's contract law and
the trends of "freedom of contract." These issues are discussed in the
setting of China's special cultural, legal, economic, and political
circumstances, including both formal and informal institutions. The article
concludes by providing normative recommendations on how to reconcile
"freedom of contract" with the current contract law.
II. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
A. Evolution of China's Contract Law
1. China's Contract Practice and Law in the Era of Central Planning
As one can only understand the functions of a law through the
understanding of the social and economic background, this article first
studies the political and economic background of China's contract law.
a. The Meaning of "Central Planning" and Its Implication
A centrally planned economy was one of the most significant
characteristics of China's previous economy form, under which economic
units were expected to create a plan for their activities and coordinate with
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the government to provide resources to achieve the goals under the plan.'
Prompted by dissatisfaction with the results of the traditional system of
collective agriculture and planned industry and commerce,2 China began a
major program of economic reform.
b. Reflection of Central Planning on Contracts
Under the central planning framework, contracts were essentially
administrative devices. The state plans need to be fulfilled and put into
practice by bringing suppliers and customers together. Under these
arrangements, people are forced to enter into transfers as the transfers have
already been arranged according to the state plan. The nature of contracts is
mandatory under these arrangements. Specifically, in a planned economy,
contracts are expected to guarantee the fulfillment of the state plan, test the
state plan to see if it is correctly made, and provide information for the state
accordingly.' In practice, most industrial and wholesale contracts were
entered into at goods-ordering conferences attended by those who would
produce and deliver products under the plan. At these conferences, instead
of having parties negotiate the agreements by themselves, ministries would
assign the matching parties, and even influence the terms of the resulting
agreements.
1. For detailed discussions about China's previous centrally planned economy as well as the
reform towards market economy, see, e.g., John McMillan & Barry Naughton, How to Reform a
Planned Economy: Lessons from China, 8 OxFORD REv. ECON. POL'Y 459, 460 (1992); Lucie Cheng &
Arthur Rosett, Contract with a Chinese Face: Socially Embedded Factors in Transformation from
Hierarchy to Market, 1978-1989, 5 J. CHINESE L. 143, 229 (1991).
2. See Jan S. Prybyla, Economic Reform of Socialism: The Dengist Course in China, 507
ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 113, 117 (1990) (explaining that the need to reform the Chinese
economy arose from the economy's serious quality problems: chronic shortages, waste, low factor
productivity and technological backwardness).
3. The period of reform coincided with the period of legalization. See, e.g., Benjamin L.
Liebman, Assessing China's Legal Reforms, 23 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 17, 28 (2009); Pitman B. Potter,
Legal Reform in China: Institutions, Culture, and Selective Adaptation, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465,
465 (2004); Franklin Allen, Jun Qian & Meijun Qian, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China,
77 J. FIN. ECON. 57, 57 (2005).
4. See, e.g., Lucie Cheng & Arthur Rosett, Contract with a Chinese Face: Socially
Embedded Factors in Transformation from Hierarchy to Market, 1978-1989, 5 J. CHINESE L. 143, 192
(1991). As the authors insightfully pointed out, those "contracts" were not the product of the parties'
agreement or exchange and were of only limited significance in defining performance obligations.
5. See, e.g., David A. Hayden, The Role of Contract Law in Developing the Chinese Legal
Culture, 10 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 571, 572 (1987).
6. See generally RICHARD M. PFEFFER, UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS CONTRACTS IN CHINA
1949-1963 18 (Harvard University Press 1973); WANG LIMING & CUI JIANYUAN, HETONGFA XINLUN
[NEW DIscusSIoNS ON CONTRACT LAW] 91 (2000).
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c. From Three Contract Laws to A Unified Contract Law
Paralleling the special meaning and function of contracts in China, the
pertinent contract laws also had special characteristics and served special
functions. Between 1979 and 1999, instead of having a general system of
contract law to govern all contracts, a few distinct sets of contract rules had
been established.' In the 1980s, China adopted the Economic Contract
Law,9 Foreign Economic Contract Law,'o General Principles of Civil Law,"
and Technology Contract Law,' 2 respectively. These major pieces of law,
together with other administrative regulations and judicial interpretations,
formed the entire framework for contract law.13 In addition, China acceded
to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods in 1988.14
The adoption of the Contract Law of the People's Republic of China
(Contract Law) in March 1999 was deemed as one of the pivotal
achievements in China's legal reform to accommodate the emerging market
economy because the Contract Law reduced state intervention to the
minimum level, demonstrating that contracts are no longer deemed as
vehicles of carrying out the state economic plan.'5
7. For an overview of the evolution of China's contract laws, see Feng Chen, The New Era of
Chinese Contract Law: History, Development and A Comparative Analysis, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 153,
153 (2001).
8. wANG LIMING & CuI JIANYUAN, HETONGFA XINLUN [NEW DiscussioNS ON CONTRACT
LAW] 90 (2000).
9. Id. Adopted in 1981.
10. Id. Adopted in 1985.
11. Id. Adopted in 1986.
12. Id. Adopted in 1987.
13. See Zhou Jianhua & Yu Guanghua, China's Uniform Contract Law: Progress and
Problems, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 4 (1999).
14. See Friedrich Blase, CISG and China-An Intercontinental Exchange, 4 VINDOBONA J. OF
INT'L COM. L. & ARB. 95, 95 (2000) (discussing the Convention's influence on the development of
China's contract law).
15. See Mo Zhang, Freedom of Contract with Chinese Legal Characteristics: A Closer Look
at China's New Contract Law, 14 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 237, 237 (2000). See also Jiang Ping et
al., Lun Xin Hetongfa Zhongde Hetong Ziyou Yuanze yu Chengshi Xinyong Yuanze [On the Principles of
Freedom of Contract and Good Faith in the New Contract Law], 1 TRtB. POL. SC. & L. 2, 3-7 (1999);
Zhou Jianhua & Yu Guanghua, China's Uniform Contract Law: Progress and Problems, 17 UCLA
PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 2 (1999).
108 [Vol. 17:1
2. The Significance for China of Adopting the Principle of "Freedom of
Contract"
In the United States, as one of the cornerstones of private law,
"freedom of contract"' 6  in the contemporary period has undergone
considerable erosions and restrictions due to such factors as the increased
use of standard contracts and the mandatory economic regulation by the
government.' 7 However, in a transition economy,' 8 "freedom of contract"
was relatively new in China and it must be promoted as a central principle
of contract law.19 Another compelling reason to adopt the principle of
"freedom of contract" lies in the need to foster transactions. 20 In fact,
"freedom of contract" is both a requirement of the market economy as well
as an impetus for the same.2 ' With the development of a market economy,
many scholars have argued that parties in a market economy should have
the autonomy and freedom to decide on the transactions they enter. It is
only through transactions based on free decisions of the parties that the
economic and social resources will be allocated efficiently and effectively
through market mechanism. 22  Contracts create wealth, allocate risks and
resources, and also constitute one of the fundamental institutions that
underpin the market system. 23  Contracts typically are efficient in the
16. "Freedom of contract" is a judicial concept that contracts are based on mutual agreement
and free choice, and thus should not be hampered by external control such as governmental interference.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 735 (8th ed. 2004).
17. See, e.g., Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the "Rise and Fall", 79
B.U. L. REv. 263, 289 (1999).
18. See Thomas W. Waelde & James L. Gunderson, Legislative Reform in Transition
Economies: Western Transplants: A Short-Cut to Social Market Economy Status?, 43 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 347, 347 (1994) (discussing legal reform in transition economies).
19. Jiang Ping et al., Lun Xin Hetongfa zhongde Hetong Ziyou Yuanze yu Chengshi Xinyong
Yuanze [On the Principles of Freedom of Contract and Good Faith in the New Contract Law], 1 TRIB.
POL. SC. & L. 2,4 (1999).
20. See, e.g., Wang Liming & Xu Chuanxi, Fundamental Principles of China's Contract Law,
13 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 2 (1999).
21. Jiang Ping et al., Shichang Jingii he Yisi Zizhi [Market Economy and Autonomy of Will], 6
CASS J.L. 20, 20-25 (1993) (quoted by Wang Liming & Xu Chuanxi, Fundamental Principles of
China's Contract Law, 13 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 12 (1999)). The authors indicate that to accord parties
freedom of action to the greatest extent possible is the common demand by the market economy and the
autonomy of the parties' free will. See also, ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
EcoNoMics OF CONTRACT LAW 1-2 (1979).
22. See, e.g., Li Yongjun, Cong Qiyue Ziyou Yuanze de Jichu Kan Qi zai Xiandai Hetongfa
Shangde Diwei [On the Status of Contract Freedom in Modem Contract Laws from the Viewpoint of its
Foundation], 4 J. COMP. L. 1, 4-5 (2002).
23. See, e.g., Yulie Foka-Kavalieraki & Aristides N. Hatzis, The Foundations of A Market
Economy: Contract, Consent, Coercion, 8 EUR. VIEW 29, 29 (2009).
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absence of coercion and information asymmetry.24 The more developed
and widespread the various contractual relationship, the more dynamic the
market economy.
3. The Definition and Incidence of "Freedom of Contract" in Current
Contract Law of China
a. The Chinese Version of "Freedom of Contract"
China's contract laws have never explicitly recognized the principle of
"freedom of contract," and in fact this principle underwent intense debate
during the drafting of the Contract Law.25 As a compromise, the Contract
Law adopted the notion of "freedom of contract" in the form of a bundle of
principles with some checks and balances.26
In China, the meaning of "freedom of contract" still remains somewhat
vague. This article agrees with certain scholars that "freedom of contract"
should be reflected in all aspects of China's contract law. The principle of
"freedom of contract" is partially reflected in several articles of the
Contract Law. The principle of equality serves as the basis of "freedom of
contract."27 Article 4 of the Contract Law provides the principle of
voluntariness that embodies the core of "freedom of contract,"28 whereas
Article 8 of the Contract Law stipulates the legal consequences of the
exercise of the freedom of contract and affirms the binding character of
24. See generally Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades:
Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 853 (2003); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the
Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REv. 683, 716 (1986).
25. For a commentary about the debate, see Jiang Ping et al., Lun Xin Hetongfa zhongde
Hetong Ziyou Yuanze yu Chengshi Xinyong Yuanze [On the Principles of Freedom of Contract and
Good Faith in the New Contract Law], I TRIB. POL. SCI. & L. 2, 3-5 (1999).
26. The major concern in adopting "freedom of contract" was that it might be abused by the
large enterprises to bully the small enterprises, which would disrupt the economic order. As a result, a
compromising version of "freedom of contract" was adopted by the Contract Law. Wang Liming, supra
note 20, at 11. In addition, "freedom of contract" is largely seen as a Western notice, the difficulty in
transplanting this notion might be another concern.
27. Contract Law of the People's Republic of China [Contracts; Enterprises with Foreign
Investment] (promulgated by the Second Session of the Ninth National People's Congress, Mar. 15,
1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999) Nat'l People's Congress, Mar. 15, 1999, art. 3 (China), available at
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n40Ol948/n4002075/n4O02315/4060252.html (last visited Oct. I1,
2010) (providing that the parties to the contract have equal legal status, and neither party may impose its
will on the other) [hereinafter Contract Law of the People's Republic of China].
28. Id. art. 4 (indicating that the parties shall, pursuant to law, have the right to enter into a
contract on their own free will, and no unit or person may unlawfully interfere).
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contract. Moreover, "freedom of contract" also means that parties should
have the autonomy in negotiating and deciding the content of the contract.
Article 124 of the Contract Law has provided this autonomy to the
contractual parties.30  At the same time, the Contract Law also imposes
limitations on "freedom of contract" in order to prevent its abuses and for
the state to regulate the economy and maintain public order.3' Noticeably,
the Contract Law contains provisions that recognize the limited role of the
state plan and governmental supervision of contracts.32
b. The Emphasis When Implementing Freedom of Contract in
Different Stages of Contracting
"Freedom of contract" should be reflected in all aspects of China's
contract law, from formation through remedies for breach of contract. In
particular, the parties should enjoy the freedom to decide whether or not to
enter into a contract and with whom to make a contract, and decide the
form and content of the contract without unjustifiable interference by
governmental and administrative organizations. Moreover, when
interpreting contracts, judges should honor the contractual parties' original
intentions.34
B. Comments on the Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract in Western
Legal Thoughts
The most complex part of "freedom of contract" lies in balancing the
tension between contractual freedom and governmental regulations. As
insightfully pointed out by Professor John C. Reitz, although all legal
systems have some form of governmental regulation, the degree to which a
country is averse to governmental regulation varies from country to
country, even among the countries in the western world. Particularly, the
U.S. aversion to regulation is not shared as deeply by most other western
29. Id. art. 8 (indicating that a legally executed contract has legal binding force on the parties.
The parties shall fulfill their obligations as contracted, and may not arbitrarily modify or terminate the
contract. A legally executed contract is protected by law.).
30. Id. art. 124 (providing that where there is no express provision in the Specific Provisions
thereof or any other law concerning a certain contract, the provisions in the General Principles thereof
apply, and reference may be made to the provisions in the Specific Provisions thereof or any other law
applicable to a contract which is most similar to such contract).
31. These limitations will be discussed in detail in infra Part VI.B. 1.
32. BING LING, CONTRACT LAW IN CHINA 9 (Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2002).
33. Wang Liming, An Inquiry into Several Difficult Problems in Enacting China's Unform
Contract Law, 8 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 351, 356-57 (1999).
34. See id.
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countries. In reality, certain European countries are more disposed to limit
"freedom of contract" than in the United States.35 By tracing the history
and discussion of Maine's famous dictum that the progress of the law has
been from status to contract,36 Professor Morris R. Cohen indicates that the
support of Maine's dictum had its roots in the "general individualistic
philosophy that manifested itself in modem religion, metaphysics,
psychology, ethics, economics, and political theory."37 After the peak of
"contractualism" 38 and will theory of contract, "freedom of contract"
gradually declined. Many U.S. legal scholars have reconsidered their
thinking about the future of "freedom of contract." 3 9  Certain scholars
argued for broad interference with personal preferences. 4 0  "Freedom of
contract" has been attacked as ignoring the bulky concentration of wealth
that distorts market processes and that tramples on the rights of consumers
and workers.4 1 For instance, the issue of unequal bargaining power, which
may result in forced consent, is one of them.42 In addition, the parties may
not realize the "freedom of contract," achieving the original intentions of
the agreement due to the high transaction costs among the parties during the
process.4 3 Instead of commenting on the rise and fall of "freedom of
contract" by generalization, certain scholars suggest that breaking up the
concept of "freedom of contract" into more specific meanings may be
35. For example, German law subjects standard terms and conditions to greater regulation
than U.S. law, see John C. Reitz, Political Economy and Contract Law, in NEW FEATURES IN
CONTRACT LAW 247 (Reiner Shulze ed., 2007).
36. Sir Henry Maine said "we may say that the movement of the progressive societies has
hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract." HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 182 (Sir Frederick
Pollock ed., 1930), available at http://www.panarchy.org/maine/contract.html (last visited Oct. 14,
2010).
37. Morris R. Cohen, The Basics of Contract, 46 HARv. L. REv. 553, 558 (1932).
38. See id. (defining "contractualism" as the view that in an ideally desirable system of law all
obligations would arise only out of the will of the individual contracting freely, rests not only on the will
theory of contract but also on the political doctrine that all restraint is evil and that the government is
best which governs least).
39. See, e.g., Grant Gilmore, Introduction to Havighurst's Limitations upon Freedom of
Contract, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 165, 166 (1979).
40. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 33-63 (1992).
41. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CONTRACTS SMALL AND CONTRACT LARGE: CONTRACT LAW
THROUGH THE LENS OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE, IN THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 1 (F.H.
Buckley ed., 1999).
42. It is hard for the contract terms to truly reflect the consent of a party with little bargaining
power. See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts ofAdhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REv. 1173, 1175 (1983).
43. EPSTEIN, supra note 41, at 15.
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helpful in identifying particular trends that more accurately reflect the
directions taken by the government."
However, certain scholars observed that contract law is moving
towards a period of "new formalism,"45 where sophisticated parties are held
to a more stringent set of rules vis-A-vis non-sophisticated parties.
Following that approach, once a contractual party is labeled as
sophisticated, certain presumptions will be imposed automatically, such as
the person has relevant experience and knowledge. As a result, those
presumptions really cut against those people being labeled as
sophisticated.46 Paradoxically, this trend, from contract to status (namely,
sophisticated or not),47 in reality moves in the opposite direction of what
Maine has depicted. However, "freedom of contract" has been working
differently in China and moves along a special evolution path accordingly.48
III. A COMPARISON OF THE RATIONALES BEHIND
U.S. AND CHINA'S CONTRACT LAWS
This article will now compare the U.S. and China's contract laws in
general works to spot the current tensions and problems in China's contract
laws. It is interesting to notice that it seems the U.S. and China's contract
law systems are confronted by prima facie "similar" problems, dilemmas,
and intractable tensions. However, China is still at the stage as Deng
Xiaoping's widely quoted phrase "crossing the river by groping for stones,"
and thus the problems encountered by the two countries might be
intrinsically different in nature. Analyzing the tensions in the ideological
and institutional settings, in which contract laws are embedded, might
generate insightful suggestions for both countries.
A. Ideological Level: Paternalism v. Contractualism
Although the term "paternalism" has various meanings and
definitions,49 in general, any legal rule that prohibits an action on the
44. See, e.g., Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the "Rise and Fall", 79
B.U. L. REv. 263, 271 (1999).
45. See, e.g., Mark Movsesian, Two Cheers for Freedom of Contract, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.
1529, 1530 (2002).
46. See, e.g., Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New Formalism,
75 Mo. L. REv. 493, 493 (2010). Moreover, what is problematic is that "sophisticated" is not well
defined.
47. "Sophistication" is certainly a significant indicia of one's socioeconomic status.
48. See infra Part V.
49. GERALD DWORKIN, PATERNALISM: SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, IN PATERNALISM 19 (Rolf
Sartorius ed., 1983); Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, 1 CANADIAN. J. OF PHIL. 105, 105 (1971).
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ground that it would be contrary to the actor's own welfare is paternalistic
in nature.50 Paternalistic interventions may be classified according to
various parameters.5 ' The censure of paternalism within contract law
directly follows from the individualistic conceptions underlying the
principle of "freedom of contract." On the other hand, there are
justifications for paternalism, and numerous rules and doctrines ground, at
least partly, in paternalism. 52 Some instances of paternalism in contract law
do not entail a rejection of private autonomy, but may rather be viewed as
enhancing free will.53
Accordingly, the role of state may vary in different situations and
times, based upon the ideological background. In different contexts, the
state may act as a director,5 4 a gate-keeper,55 or even an ad hoc contractual
party, each with different implications for the contracting party. The role of
the state in contracts and contract law is no exception. Generally speaking,
with respect to the contract law (being one of the most important
instruments to facilitate transactions in a market economy), the state should
leave sufficient room for the contractual individuals. Only when public
goods and services are concerned, or when a market fails, should the state
jump in as the gate-keeper in order to keep the economy from falling
apart." The debates and discussions in the United States provide China
with insights and reference. However, given the different social and
50. Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 763
(1983).
51. Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency ofPaternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229,236 (1998).
52. See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 765
(1983) (finding that there are different plausible justifications for one particular group or class of
paternalistic restriction in the contract law: consideration of economic efficiency, distributive justice,
personal integrity, to name a few). See also Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract
Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1785 (1997).
53. For example, intervening with the freedom of people who are unable to make rational
decision due to their young age.
54. The Shanxi provincial government's role in the coal mining reform is an example. For a
detailed discussion about Shanxi coal mining reform, see supra Part III.A.
55. Chinese law requires several types of contracts to be approved by the government. These
contracts usually concern important public interests, and governmental examination and approval are
necessary before the agreement of the parties may become legally effective. Chinese-foreign joint
venture contracts, Chinese-foreign petroleum exploitation contracts, and contracts for the import of
technology are some major examples of contracts requiring government approval.
56. See generally ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, CONTRACT LAW, THE FREE MARKET, AND STATE
INTERVENTION: A JURISPRUDENTIAL PERSPECTIVE, IN STATE, SOC. & CORP. POWER 17 (Marc R. Tool
& Warren J. Samuels eds., 1989); Andreas Maurer, Consumer Protection and Social Models of
Continental and Anglo-American Contract Law and the Transnational Outlook, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 353, 353-54 (2007).
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economic infrastructure, it is always advisable to bear in mind that what
works in the United States might come out differently in China.
Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that the state doesn't necessarily
know the interests of individual citizens better than the citizens know
themselves.
B. Institutional Level: Rules v. Standards
The development of legal infrastructure is the means through which to
achieve economic development. 9  Generally speaking, there are two
opposing models for developing legal solutions to substantive problems.
One formal model favors the use of clearly defined, highly administrable,
general rules, and the other supports the use of equitable standards
producing ad hoc decisions with relatively little precedential value.60
A "rule" would specify in advance the conduct to which it is applied,
while a "standard" merely provides general guidance without specifying the
precise details of the conduct required.6' There are always tensions
between using rules or standards.62
Judge Richard A. Posner insightfully recognizes the fundamental
tradeoff between making an investment in developing rules and in training
the judiciary.63 Accordingly, he argues that enacting comprehensive rules
57. See, e.g., Donald Clarke, Lost in Translation? Corporate Legal Transplants in China 2
(The George Wash. Univ. Law School Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 213, 2006),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-913784 (last visited Oct. 16, 2010) (borrowing foreign norms and
institutions in a time of rapid social change where the home culture is lagging behind is one of the
reasons explaining why it is often difficult for transplanted legal norms to fit well).
58. See, e.g., Sun Xuezhi, Qiyue Ziyou, Qiyue Ziyouquan yu Qiyue Quanli [Freedom of
Contract, Right of Freedom of Contract and Contractual Rights], 46 JILIN UNIV. J. Soc. ScI. 13, 16
(2006).
59. See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, Does Law Matter for Economic Development?: Evidence from
East Asia, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 829, 836 (2000) (discussing that there has been rich scholarships on
the relationship between legal infrastructure and economic development); Daniel M. Klerman, Legal
Infrastructure, Judicial Independence, and Economic Development, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL Bus.
& DEv. L.J. 427, 427, 434 (2007).
60. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L.
REV. 1685, 1685 (1975).
61. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Venus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 557
(1992).
62. See Louis KAPLOW, GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RULES, IN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS 9-10 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 1998) (introducing the rules
versus standards). See also Kaplow, supra note 61, at 557.
63. Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13 WORLD
BANK RES. OBSERVER 1, 1 (1998).
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is more efficient than cultivating a sophisticated judiciary for a developing
nation.
Based upon comparison between U.S. and China's contract law and
the jurisprudence, comprehensive institutional reform in China should be
carried out systematically and holistically, rather than devising discrete
solutions to particular problems. The entire system should be evaluated as
a whole in order to ensure that the economic, legal and social goals of the
society are fulfilled. Specifically, in the realm of laws regulating contracts,
65
other laws shall be adopted in addition to judicial interpretation.
VI. LIMITATIONS ON THE "FREEDOM OF CONTRACT"
Governmental intervention limiting "freedom of contract" can take
various forms: generating rules prohibiting certain types of agreements,
supervising certain types of agreements, and deciding whether or not to
enforce certain agreements, among others.
A. A Preliminary but Fundamental Issue
Before diving into the discussion about the limitations on the "freedom
of contract," it is worth noticing that while the government has been
emphasizing "freedom of contract" in the contract law, there are still certain
instances where the government dominates. The relevant question here is
what are the areas where governmental intervention is justified, or even
necessary, and thus are immune from "freedom of contract?" In other
words, what are the areas, if any, that "freedom of contract" is inapplicable?
The Shanxi coal mining reform is a case on point here. The
government of Shanxi Province has, in accordance with certain
governmental regulations and policies, pushed for the implementation of
the coal mine mergers and acquisitions. Certain people viewed this as a
reform because the state-owned companies were able to benefit at the
expense of the private sector. During this transformation, if the coal bosses
did not accept the plan proposed by the government, their coal mines would
be forced to shut down. This is part of the Chinese government's efforts to
consolidate the coal industry to improve production efficiency and reduce
coal mine accidents. In search for a reasonable balance between public and
64. See id.
65. Examples include (but are not limited to) those laws guaranteeing consumer sovereignty,
laws safeguarding fair competition, and laws regulating employment related contracts.
66. Views on Implementing Acceleration of the Reorganization and Merger of Coal
Enterprises, http://www.shanxigov.cn/nl6/nll16/nl458/nl518/n34105/6955367.html (last visited
October 29, 2010).
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non-public economy, as well as the balance between national concerns and
various interest groups' pressure, the government dominated the entire
process of forced mergers where the small coal mines have been merged
into one of the seven state-owned coal mines designated by the government.
Moreover, instead of being a result of free negotiation and bargain, the
amount of the consideration in those mergers and acquisitions are
determined by the government. Apparently, the approach is at odds with
"freedom of contract." On the other hand, given the complexity of the
intertwined issues involved (such as environmental protection related
issues, the public interests of the region, the production safety, and the coal
industry policies), it is plausible that the governmental intervention is
justified. However, the key is how the government should implement the
plan. Looking back, the government's approach in this reform could be
improved by relying more on the market mechanism as opposed to the
governmental planning. For example, the small coal mining bosses should
be given certain time to adjust their business through their voluntary
strategic alliances and those who are able to meet the governmentally
imposed criteria after adjustment should survive. Moreover, those small
coal mining bosses should be given more options in selecting their mergers
and acquisitions partners as well as other aspects of the mergers and
acquisitions.
B. Overarching Limitations on "Freedom of Contract"
The principle of "good faith" and the obligation not to offend public
order and good morals serve as the two overarching limitations on
"freedom of contract." These two principles are applicable to all types of
contracts and in every stage of the contractual process.
1. The Obligation to Act in Good Faith
As an overarching limitation on "freedom of contract," the principle of
"good faith"67 requires the contractual parties to act faithfully to the agreed
67. The contour and meaning of "good faith" may vary with the legal system and context. As
a result, defining "good faith" is a formidable task. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205
cmt. a (1979) made a nice try in defining "good faith" (finding that good faith performance or
enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with
the justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as
involving 'bad faith' because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.
The appropriate remedy for a breach of the duty of good faith also varies with the circumstances.).
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purpose of the contract. In fact, this principle has been reflected
throughout the entire Contract Law. In the Contract Law, Article 670
requires the parties observe the principle of honesty and good faith in
exercising their rights and performing their obligations. In addition, Article
4271 makes it clear that the party shall be liable for damage if the party
negotiated a contract in bad faith72 and consequently caused losses to the
other party.73  Furthermore, Article 6074 requires the parties abide by the
principle of good faith and perform various obligations in accordance with
the nature and purpose of the contract and the transaction custom.
Additionally, Article 927s stipulates that after the termination of the rights
and obligations under the contract, the parties shall observe the principle of
honesty and good faith and perform various obligations pursuant to relevant
transaction custom. Moreover, the principle of "good faith" could also kick
in where anticipatory breach occurs. Article 10876 indicates that where one
party to a contract expresses explicitly or indicates through its acts that it
will not perform the contract, the other party may demand it to bear the
liability for the breach of contract before the expiration of the performance
period. However, "good faith" prevents one from stopping the performance
of one's duty just because of the other party's minor incompliance.77
68. For a general discussion about the evolution of the principle of good faith as well as its
reflection in China's contract law, see Chen Nianbing, Shilun Hetongfa Zhong De Chengshi Xinyong
Yuanze [On the Bona Fide Doctrine in the Contract Law], 6 LEGAL SCI. 59 (2003).
69. See Wang Liming & Xu Chuanxi, Fundamental Principles of China's Contract Law, 13
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 7-9 (1999) (discussing, in general, the good faith principle as it applies in
China).
70. Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 6.
71. Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 42.
72. The "excluder" approach suggested by Professor Robert S. Summers might be a good
prototype for China in applying the principle of "good faith:" "good faith" essentially excludes certain
types of conduct characterized as "bad faith" because "bad faith" is relatively easier to define. See
Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Unform
Commercial Code, 54 Va. L. Rev. 195, 196 (1968); Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good
Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 810, 812 (1982).
73. Similar to the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo. See Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine,
Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77
HARV. L. REv. 401,401,446-47(1964).
74. Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 60.
75. Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 92.
76. Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 108.
77. For example, A and B entered into a contract where B is going to supply goods to A, while
A is supposed to pay $1 million USD to B, and A told B that he had a gap of $500 USD. Can B then
cancel the contract? Probably not; the legal basis here lies in the principle of "good faith."
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Moreover, Article 12578 imposes the "good faith" obligation when
interpreting disputed clauses of the contract. Although it is acknowledged
"good faith" can cure some ills of "freedom of contract," there are some
inherent limitations related to it.7 9 Furthermore, it will impose significant
demand on the judiciary's capability in interpreting contracts.
2. The Obligation Not to Offend Public Order and Good Morals
Another principal check on "freedom of contract" is the requirement
not to offend public order (examples of contracts that offend public order
include contracts for tax evasion, unfair competition, profiteering, and
gambling) and good morals (examples of contracts that offend good morals
include contracts that are immoral such as sale of human organs), contracts
for servitude, bad faith behavior (such as entering into contracts by taking
advantage of one's financial difficulties, and prenuptial agreement). Some
scholars argue that the requirement not to offend public order and good
morals is a way to correct the "freedom of contract" so as to truly reflect the
real freedom of the contracting parties.80  This requirement has been
reflected in the General Principles of Civil Law8 ' as well as various other
specific laws and regulations.8 2 Accordingly, one caveat is worth
mentioning here. The judiciary should be cautious so as not to overreact
when there are potential offenses of public order or good morals, as going
beyond the limit is as bad as falling short.
78. Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 125.
79. Zhang Suhua, Chengshi Xinyong Yuanze dui Qiyue Ziyou Yuanze de Xianzhi [The
Principle of Good Faith's Limitation on Freedom of Contract], 4 LAW SCI. MAG. 17, 18-19 (1999).
80. See, e.g., Feng Zhongming, Hetong Ziyou yu Gongxu Liangsu [Freedom of Contract and
Public Order and Kind Custom], 17 J. OF YUNNAN UNIV. LAW ED. 73, 75 (2004).
81. General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the
Fourth Session of the Sixth National People's Congress, Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987) Nat'l
People's Congress, Apr. 12, 1986, art. 7 (China) (indicating that civil activities shall have respect for
social ethics and shall not harm the public interest, undermine state economic plans, or disrupt social
economic order).
82. See, e.g., Zhao Wanyi & Wu Xiaofeng, Qiyue Ziyou yu Gongxu Liangsu [Freedom of
Contract and Public Order and Kind Custom], 25 MODERN LAW SCI. 52, 57-58 (2003).
83. For example, in 2001, a court in China invalidated a will simply because the legatee is the
mistress of the decedent. This seems an egregious infringement on the party's autonomy. Here, the
court overreacted, at least in my opinion.
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C. Various Specific Limitations on "Freedom of Contract"
In addition to the overall limitations on "freedom of contract," there
are a few specific limitations that only apply to certain types of contractual
relationships in some settings.
1. Administrative Approval and Supervision
Chinese laws require several types of contracts to be approved by the
government. These contracts usually concern important public interests,
and governmental examination and approval are necessary before the
agreement of the parties may become legally effective. 84
Moreover, the Contract Law entitles administrative authorities to
supervise all illegal activities by voiding contracts that have harmed the
interests of the state and the public.85 This suggests that administrative
authorities shall determine whether a contract has harmed the interests of
the state, the collective or the third party. For certain types of
contracts/projects, such as those contracts where state assets are involved
and infrastructure project construction contracts,86 it is necessary to have
certain supervision. Moreover, government needs to guard against those
"contracts" that are an attempt to conceal illegal goals under the disguise of
legitimate forms as well as those contracts that harm social and public
interest." However, it is critical to ascertain the appropriate reaches of the
administrative supervision. This issue needs to be further addressed
through law, regulation, or the Supreme People's Court's interpretation to
ensure that the administrative interference is strictly limited within the
84. For example, Sino-foreign joint venture contracts need governmental approval to become
legally effective.
85. Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 127. The departments of
administration for industry and commerce and other relevant administrative authorities are, within their
respective jurisdictions, in charge of supervising and handling illegal acts whereby a contract is used to
harm the state or public interests.
86. Ruan Zanlin & Jin Qizhou, Hetong Xingzheng Jianguan de Xinsikao [A New Speculative
Research on the Administrative Supervision and Control over Contracts], 22 MODERN LAw ScI. 122,
123 (2000).
87. See ADMINISTRATION FOR INDUSTRY & COMMERCE, ZUOHAO HETONG XINGZHENG
JLANGUAN GONGZUO, YI SHIJI XINGDONG LuOSHI QUANGUO GONGSHANG GONGZUO HuIYI YAOQIU
[PROPERLY CONDUCT THE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OF CONTRACTS TO IMPLEMENT THE
REQUIREMENTS RAISED IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRY & COMMERCE CONFERENCE BY PRACTICE] 29-30
(2003).
88. See Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 52.
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appropriate boundaries.89 In addition, the state plan contemplated by
Article 38 of the Contract law might affect the parties' contract-making
power.90
2. Special Care for Vulnerable Parties
Similar to other countries, the urgent need to protect the weak parties
in contractual relationships 9' is another significant challenge for China's
contract law and legal system.
Modem economic activities are characterized by the widespread use of
standard terms. While standard terms generally expedite the formation of
contracts and promote economic efficiency, monopolistic entities and other
economically advantaged parties tend to use standard terms as a means of
imposing unconscionable or unfair, contractual terms on consumers and
other weaker parties. In China, the function of standard form contract in
earlier times was quite different from those in western countries at that
92time. In more recent years, standard terms have been widely used in those
industries that are monopolized by the government or state-owned
enterprises or are heavily regulated, such as banking, public transportation,
and public utilities. The potential harm that standard contracts may impose
on a consumer is addressed by several provisions. For instance, the
Contract Law requires the party who provides a standard contract form to
explain the terms and draw the other party's attention to the
exclusion/restriction of liability.9 3  Moreover, the Contract law embraces
the Chinese version of "contra proferentem rule," 94 whereby Article 4195 of
the Contract Law stipulates that if a dispute arises over the understanding of
89. See Mo Zhang, Freedom of Contract with Chinese Legal Characteristics: A Closer Look
at China's New Contract Law, 14 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 237, 248-49 (2000).
90. Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 38. This article provides that where
the state has issued a mandatory plan or a state purchasing order based on necessity, the relevant legal
persons and the other organizations shall conclude a contract between them in accordance with the
rights and obligations as stipulated by the relevant laws and administrative regulations.
91. See generally ROBERT HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE
GOVERNING POWER (1952).
92. In China, standard terms and standard contracts were once used as a means of enforcing
mandatory state plans. Standard terms were imposed by the government and reflected the requirements
of state plans from which the parties could not derogate. See also supra Part II.
93. Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 39.
94. See PtTER CSERNE, POLICY CONSIDERATIONS, IN CONTRACT INTERPRETATION: THE
CONTRA PROFERENTEM RULE FROM A COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE, IN
CONTRACT THEORY-CORPORATE LAw 66 (Gavvala Radhika ed., 2009) (showing a comparative
overview of the rule).
95. Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 41.
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a standard clause, and the standard clause has more than one interpretation,
the clause shall be interpreted in a manner unfavorable to the party
providing the clause. In addition, if a standard clause is inconsistent with
the non-standard clause, the non-standard clause shall be adopted.
In addition to the Contract Law, the Law of the People's Republic of
China on Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests is another powerful
weapon for the consumers in China.96 However, how a consumer rights
protection law regulates economic behavior is also important. Here, the
"corkage fee" dispute provides a neat example to examine what is the
reasonable boundary of governmental intervention through rule making and
how the rule making process should be. As a common business practice in
certain areas (such as Guizhou) of China, certain restaurants charge a
corkage fee. As a reaction, the Guizhou Consumer Protection Regulation
was enacted and the regulation expressly prohibits restaurants from
charging corkage fees.97  Clearly, this is the legislature's intervention
aiming to protect consumers. If those restaurants have given consumers
enough advanced notice with respect to the corkage fee, it seems that
consumers enjoy absolute freedom to decide which restaurant they will go
to, whether those restaurants which charge corkage fees or those that do not
charge such fees. However, given that the corkage fee practice has been
formalized as trade usage among the restaurant business, in reality
consumers do not have much "freedom" to choose which restaurant to dine.
As a result, legislature's intervention by rule making seems opportune
under the circumstance. However, it seems that blanket prohibition of
corkage fees is somewhat arbitrary. As a result, it might be advisable to
have representatives of the consumer protection association, as well as the
restaurant business association, participate in the rule making process in
formulating the regulation.
Likewise, in other situations where there is disparity with respect to
bargaining power (e.g., landlord-tenant, employer-employee), special laws
or provisions are needed to regulate these special contractual
96. Law of the People's Republic of China on Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests
(promulgated by the Fourth Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People's
Congress, Oct. 31, 1993, effective Jan. 1, 1994) Nat'l People's Congress, Oct. 31, 1993, art. 24 (China),
available at http://fj.baic.gov.cn/shunyildetail.asp?ID=1560 (last visited Oct. 14, 2010) (prohibiting
business operators from making rules that are unfair to the consumers through standard contracts and
excluding civil liability for their infringement of the consumers' rights).
97. See Consumer Protection Regulation of Guizhou Province (Nov. 24, 2006, effective Feb.
1, 2007), art. 29 (China), available at http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/showl.php?file-id= 115806 (last
visited Oct. 16, 2010).
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relationships. For instance, to better protect the lawful rights of workers,
China issued its first nationwide labor contract law on June 29, 2007, which
took effect on January 1, 2008.99 Even though it seems that the said labor
contract law already significantly strengthens the employees' rights, much
more needs to be improved to better safeguard those rights. For instance,
the labor union should be empowered more to act for the employees.
Another area relating to the protection of vulnerable parties is the
regulation of unconscionable contracts. Article 54100 of the Contract Law
provides that a contract is voidable if it is evidently unfair at the time of the
conclusion of the contract. The rationale is to prevent the advantageous
party who possesses more information from bullying the weak party
through certain kinds of coercion.101
V. OTHER OPTIONS FOR CONTRACT LAW
An institutional analysis might offer additional insights. 102 Echoing
the balance between efficiency and equity, when considering freedom of
contract in China, it is not only helpful but also necessary to study the
informal institutions, which intertwine with the legal infrastructure. The
development of commercial law is an excellent example here. When doing
complex multi-jurisdictional deals, international law firms work closely
with their clients, and help them in entering into various contracts. The
content of those contracts will reflect those business customs, which is a
type of informal institution. If there are any disputes, arbitration or other
dispute settlement mechanisms will also help institutionalizing those
business customs. Again and again, those business customs gradually
become widely-accepted commercial laws. The evolution and development
of commercial laws reflects the significance of informal institutions. In
fact, relational contract theory has reworked the contract law theory by
98. See Lu Wendao, Shilun Qiyue Ziyou Ji Lifa Ganyu [Discussion on Freedom of Contract
and Legislative Intervention], 91 NANJING Soc. SCI. 57, 59-60, 62 (1996).
99. See, e.g., Li Jing, China's New Labor Contract Law and Protection of Workers, 32
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1083, 1084-85 (2009) (discussing the labor conditions in China and how the new
labor contract law responds to the address the labor problems to better protect the workers' rights and
interest).
100. Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 54.
101. An example of nullifying a contract by a court is Huang Haiyan v. Beijing Hansen
Cosmetology Co. Ltd., Nov. 16, 2005, at 12-13 (Beijing Chaoyang Dist. People's Ct., 2005) (discussing
that the franchiser's misrepresentation rendered the contract unfair).
102. See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 1, 36, 46 (1990) (finding that the idea that a society's formal and informal institutions
contribute to relationships and transactions, and vary from culture to culture); Douglass C. North,
Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 97 (1991).
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analyzing contracts embedded in a matrix of social relations and the
understanding of the essential elements of the contextual relations. 03
Moreover, the beauty of relational contract theory lies in its capability to
theorize exchanges at the abstract level while also to contextualize in
examining the specific types of relations, including those contractual
relations between sophisticated commercial parties of relative equality as
well as those relations between parties of inequality or hierarchy.'0
Any analysis of the impact of the law on Chinese economic
development must take into consideration the extent to which laws can
perform well only when they are generated within appropriate social
contexts. 05 Among the literature in this area, the discussions between Janet
Tai Landa and John K.M. Ohnesorge are particularly thought-provoking.
By taking other informal, yet essential institutional factors into account,
Janet Tai Landa argues that it is not easy for westerners to understand the
Chinese way of doing business because instead of relying on formal
contracts, the Chinese place great emphasis on the importance of guanxi
(i.e. personal relationships) and trust in their business dealings with fellow
Chinese.106 Interestingly, this may not be peculiar to China. In particular,
some authors suggest that the role of law is different between "liberal
market economies" and "coordinated market economies" for similar
reasons. o7 In addition, Professor Landa shows that it is possible to
understand the Chinese preference for informal or extra-legal guanxi way of
doing business as an efficient system of contracting under conditions of
contract uncertainty. 08  Professor Ohnesorge recognized that the
103. See Ian MacNeil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 Nw. U. L.
REV. 877, 880, 891 (2000). See also Paul Gudel, Relational Contract Theory and the Concept of
Exchange, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 763, 777 (1998).
104. See Jay M. Feinman, The Insurance Relationship as Relational Contract and the "Fairly
Debatable" Rule for First-Party Bad Faith, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 553, 556-57 (2009).
105. See wILLIAM ALFORD, THE MORE LAW, THE MORE...? MEASURING LEGAL REFORM IN
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, IN How FAR ACROSS THE RIVER? CHINESE POLICY REFORM AT
THE MILLENNIUM 122 (Nicholas C. Hope et al ed., 2003).
106. JANET TAI LANDA, COASEAN FOUNDATIONS OF A UNIFIED THEORY OF WESTERN AND
CHINESE CONTRACTUAL PRACTICES AND ECONOMIC ORANISATIONS, IN RULES AND NETWORKS: THE
LEGAL CULTURE OF GLOBAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 347 (Richard P. Appelbaum, William L.F.
Felstiner & Volkmar Gessner ed., 2001). See also PITMAN B. POTITER, GUANXI AND THE PRC LEGAL
SYSTEM: FROM CONTRADICTION TO COMPLEMENTARITY, IN SOCIAL CONNECTION IN CHINA:
INSTITUTIONS, CULTURE, AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF GUANXI 179 (Thomas Gold, Doug Guthrie &
David Wank eds., 2002); Ethan J. Leib, Friendship & the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 631, 659 (2007).
107. See KATHARINA PISTOR, LEGAL GROUND RULES IN COORDINATED AND LIBERAL MARKET
ECONOMIES, IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CONTEXT 2 (Klaus J. Hopt et al., 2005).
108. JANET TAi LANDA, COASEAN FOUNDATIONS OF A UNIFIED THEORY OF WESTERN AND
CHINESE CONTRACTUAL PRACTICES AND ECONOMIC ORANISATIONS, IN RULES AND NETWORKS: THE
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counterpart of contract law, namely, certain code of ethics shared by
members of the relevant ethnic group, build up the infrastructure that
maintain the functioning of the ethnically homogeneous middleman group
model proposed by Janet Tai Landa.109 Moreover, in reaction to Professor
Landa's assimilation of contract law and other non-legal norms to the "rules
of the game," he suggested that there are different ways in which rule
structures interact with the playing of a game that warrant further
research.o From their discussions, people may find potential new room to
develop "freedom of contract" in China, namely, by intertwining legal
institutions with social institutions. Indeed, a good proportion of the
institutional design that has been tested by the market will enable the
contractual parties to have greater contractual freedom, and as a result, the
market will evolve specific contract types that will more genuinely reflect
the parties' desires. However, this article is not suggesting not to develop
formal laws and legal institutions, particularly because informal institutions
might reinforce social inequalities."
VI. CONCLUSION
The western notion of "freedom of contract" has provided China with
some helpful ideas which might be molded to work properly within the
Chinese society. These notions have helped to shape the development of
China's contract law in recent years. The Contract Law was an appropriate
move towards liberalizing the Chinese economy. 112
The application of "freedom of contract" requires several assumptions
and conditions to be met: adequate information, free competition, and
LEGAL CULTURE OF GLOBAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (Richard P. Appelbaum, William L.F. Felstiner
& Volkmar Gessner ed., 2001). See also John H. Matheson, Convergence, Culture and Contract Law in
China, 15 MINN. J. INT'L L. 329, 347, 381 (2006); Philip J. McConnaughay, Rethinking the Role ofLaw
and Contracts in East-West Commercial Relationships, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 427, 429 (2001); Patricia
Pattison & Daniel Herron, The Mountains are High and the Emperor is Far Away: Sanctity of Contract
in China, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 459, 461 (2003).
109. JOHN K.M. OHNESORGE, UNDERSTANDING CHINESE LEGAL AND BUSINESS NORMS: A
COMMENT ON JANET TAI LANDA'S CHAPTER, IN RULES AND NETWORKS: THE LEGAL CULTURE OF
GLOBAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 372 (Richard P. Appelbaum, William L.F. Felstiner & Volkmar
Gessner eds., 2001).
110. Id.at365-79.
Ill. This part on the interaction between institutions and economic development is based upon
communications with Professor John C. Reitz. See also Mark C. Cassona, Marina Della Giusta & Uma
S. Kambhampati, Formal and Informal Institutions and Development, 38 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 137,
137 (2010).
112. See Zhong Jianhua & Yu Guanghua, China's Unform Contract Law: Progress and
Problems, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 9 (1999).
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peoples' full rationality. However, these assumptions are at odds with the
reality in China. As a result, a modified version of "freedom of contract"
with Chinese characteristics might be suitable. Specifically, in the early
stages of the maturation of contract laws, certain governmental supervision
is necessary because in certain instances where parties are not mature
enough to understand the risks they are taking; sometimes Chinese cultural
predispositions against placing entire deals in contracts. Moreover, the
government always acts in the public interest whereas parties may only act
in the interests of their own profits. Nonetheless, legislatures,
administrative organizations and courts have to offer strong justifications
for its interventions and as well as the limitations on "freedom of contract."
Legal reform is like a comprehensive engineering project that has
various dimensions, including both top-down reform (such as those state
led rule making efforts) and bottom-up development (such as the evolution
from business customs to commercial laws). Moreover, legal reform is a
process. In light of China's special concerns, carrying out a government-
driven reform might be more efficient than cultivating a sophisticated
judiciary. In some aspects of contract law it is more efficient to have some
user-friendly rules, as opposed to adopting vague standards.
What is the future of China's contract law? In what aspects could
China's contract law be improved? In which way should these reforms of
China's contract law be carried out? What should be the interactions with
other formal or informal institutions in China? The search for the
reasonable boundary between "freedom of contract" and the justifiable
limitations is a process.
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